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Abstract
As the world becomes an interconnected network where objects and humans interact with each other, new challenges and threats
appear in the ecosystem. In this interconnected world, smart objects have an important role in giving users the chance for
life-logging in smart environments. However, smart devices have several limitations with regards to memory, resources and
computation power, hindering the opportunity to apply well-established security algorithms and techniques for secure life-logging
on the Internet of Things (IoT) domain. The need for secure and trustworthy life-logging in smart environments is vital, thus, a
lightweight approach has to be considered to overcome the constraints of smart objects. The purpose of this paper is to present
in details the current topics of life-logging in smart environments, while describing interconnection issues, security threats
and suggesting a lightweight framework for ensuring security, privacy and trustworthy life-logging. In order to investigate the
efficiency of the lightweight framework and the impact of the security attacks on energy consumption, an experimental test-bed was
developed including two interconnected users and one smart attacker, who attempts to intercept transmitted messages or interfere
with the communication link. Several mitigation factors, such as power control, channel assignment and AES-128 encryption were
applied for secure life-logging. Finally, research into the degradation of the consumed energy regarding the described intrusions is
presented.
Keywords: Smart Objects; Internet of Things; Life-logging; Security; Smart Environment; GNUradio
1. Introduction
In an interconnected smart world humans and devices inter-
act with each other, establishing a smart environment in which
the exchange of data and decisions is continuous. Smart de-
vices and in general the Internet of Things (IoT) are considered
to be one of the key elements of the 21st century. The Internet
has given us the opportunity to enhance aspects of everyday life
using computers, smart phones, social networks, etc. A Smart
Environment can be considered as a digital ecosystem consist-
ing of two layers: (i) the first one is the reality, involving com-
munications between people, daily duties or entertainment; (ii)
the second layer is the virtual life, in which humans and objects
are interconnected to a local network (or the Internet) and their
communication is achieved through various collaborating tech-
nologies offering seamless connectivity. Decisions are taken
by programmed devices or by users who have the capability to
monitor, manage, adjust and interact with their automated smart
environment.
The term smart object refers to small ubiquitous devices,
such as sensors, actuators, RFID tags, smart phones and embed-
✩This submission is an extended version of our conference papers ”Life-
logging in Smart Environments: Challenges and Security Threats” which ap-
peared in the IEEE ICC-WSConwire 2012 [1] and ”An Experimental Investiga-
tion on Energy Consumption for Secure Life-logging in Smart Environments”
which appeared in the 17th IEEE Camad 2012 [2] and has been invited for the
ISTR journal publication.
ded systems or any other type of objects that are equipped with
“intelligence”. With the exception of modern smart phones,
most smart objects have limited resources in terms of process-
ing or computational power, available memory, storage, net-
working capabilities, routing and energy. Furthermore, most
devices are incompatible with standard networking protocols,
which makes them susceptible to a number of security threats.
Finally, smart objects are able to be internetworked with other
devices, using either the IP or other non IP protocols.
One of the greatest challenges for future networks is the abil-
ity of smart objects to get connected to a local network or the
Internet under the IoT domain. The idea is transparent but
faces many unresolved issues due to the different technologies
of smart objects which try to interact with almost incompatible,
but well-established networking technologies. One of the most
important topics for the IoT is the need for connectivity with
other networks and devices. The need to assign IP addresses
in each of these devices is mandatory for many researchers and
companies. IPSO alliance [3] has made a great effort to spec-
ify the rules and the prerequisites for advocating the use of IP
networked devices. However, the limited resources of smart ob-
jects due to their design and tiny size makes it difficult to adopt
well known protocols such as the TCP/IP.
In the IoT domain, users have the potential of connecting
their life with objects physically or virtually. As a result, users
have the chance to use, monitor and manage smart devices and
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communicate with other people or objects. The act of recording
everyday life of people, their personal information and data and
the process of exchanging this information with others through-
out a network introduces the term of life-logging. Although the
term sounds new, it has been used since the old days, when peo-
ple used to keep data and records about their lives’ experiences
and manage them effectively. The life-logging procedure can
be separated into a two-phase approach in which the first is the
recording of personal data from devices (i.e. sensors and actua-
tors) and the second is their uploading onto a virtual space such
as a social network.
Life-logging in smart environments faces several challenges,
with security being the most critical one. There are several se-
curity issues regarding life-logging in an interconnected smart
world due to the lack of efficient security standards for smart
objects. Just as real-life networks encounter challenges in se-
curity, privacy and trust, the same can occur in a smart en-
vironment. Life-logging creates the possibility of disclosing
things about someone’s life that should not be revealed. Secu-
rity risks arise because of the lack of suitable security protocols
in smart devices. Smart objects have many security vulnera-
bilities caused by their limited resources for supporting well-
established cryptography and security algorithms. In an insuffi-
cient security environment new lightweight approaches should
be considered in order to overcome the lack of trust and privacy,
thereby avoiding security dangers.
The issue of energy consumption for securing smart object
such as wireless sensor networks (WSN) is an open challenge
which has been discussed in bibliography in works such as
[4, 5]. Experimental investigations concerning the energy con-
sumption of WSN have been made on [6, 7]. Theoretical anal-
ysis and simulation results for mitigating mechanisms to detect
jam attacks in wireless sensors networks are presented in [8, 9].
Moreover, experiments for intrusion detection of jamming at-
tacks and passive listening in 802.11 using software defined
radios, are described in [10, 11, 12]. Finally, channel assign-
ment based on energy detection and received signal strength in
wireless networks are presented in [13]. The decrease of en-
ergy due to the security protocols and the attempt to mitigate
attacks from eavesdroppers, passive listeners and denial of ser-
vices such as jamming attacks are critical points for research.
To our best of our knowledge, the contribution of this research
advances the state of the art by the development of an exper-
imental test-bed including all the previous different described
research areas. The setup consists of two users interconnected
with their smart devices and one smart attacker, a software de-
fined radios (SDR), whose main objective is to break any se-
curity wall on the communication channel either as a passive
listener or as a jammer. The investigation due to different secu-
rity threats, need different types of mitigation techniques such
as channel assignment, power control and encryption.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Sec-
tion 2 we present the factors of life-logging in a smart environ-
ment in which life-logging is applied to different technologies
of smart objects to the IoT. In Section 3 we discuss the secu-
rity challenges and vulnerabilities of life-logging in a smart en-
vironment and we analyze the security challenges due to en-
ergy constraints of smart objects In Section 4 we suggest a
lightweight framework consisting of the most important pillars
to overcome the described security challenges. In Section 5
we present the experimental setup containing the communica-
tion model of users, the attack model and the test-bed descrip-
tion. In Section 6 we describe different experimental scenarios
to measure and compare the energy consumption of life-logging
in smart environments concerning different security threats. We
conclude this paper in Section 7.
2. Life-logging in smart environments and the Internet of
Things
In a modern ecosystem devices, buildings and people have
the potential to create a smart environment using internal and
external interfaces of various technologies. The importance of
smart infrastructure in the context of smart cities has attracted
several companies to develop initiatives such as the IBM’s vi-
sion of Smart Planet [14] and the Smart+Connected Commu-
nities of Cisco [15]. The structure of smart environments con-
sists of three basic ingredients: (i) smart objects that interact
with the environment, (ii) the interconnection of smart objects
with the network; either the traditional Internet or the IoT, and
(iii) the procedure of life-logging in this interconnected smart
environment. The structure of the described smart ecosystem
is depicted in Figure 1, consisting of a network infrastructure
layer, an object ecosystem layer and an overlay layer.
Object Ecosystem Layer
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3G LTE
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802.15.4
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Figure 1: A life-logging smart ecosystem
2.1. Smart objects
The term smart objects was introduced for the first time
by Neil Gershefelds in his article When Things Start to Think
[16]. Their primary characteristics have been described as
their unique identity and their capability of communicating
with other objects and detecting the nature of the environ-
ment. Smart objects are small communication devices with
micro-electronic components, low-power radio, limited energy
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resources and a tiny microprocessor. Smart devices encompass
innovations such as intelligent tags (RFID), sensors that mea-
sure physical quantities and convert them into analog or digital
signals (temperature, pollution, motions), actuators that control
equipment and embedded devices that perform specific func-
tions [17]. Furthermore, smart objects can be combined with
mobile devices such as laptops, PDAs, mobile phones or smart-
phones, as well as Bluetooth devices. In the Future Internet
different wireless technologies (WiFi, 3G/4G, 802.15.4, RFID
etc) or wired ones (ethernet, PLC) might interact and create a
machine to machine ecosystem.
The most common communication technologies and proto-
cols of smart objects transmit on the unlicensed spectrum. Blue-
tooth (IEEE 802.15.1) is a standard normally used in mobile
phones, in hands-free headsets for transferring data or as a re-
placement of IrDA on remote controls. However, IrDA hard-
ware is still less expensive and does not share the same se-
curity problems encountered with wireless technologies such
as Bluetooth. Wireless sensors use the IEEE 802.15.4 proto-
col, which characterizes the Low Rate Wireless Personal Area
Network (LR WPAN). ZigBee is an extension of 802.15.4 sup-
ported by ZigBee Alliance [18], which enables the connectivity
of the devices in a mesh network architecture and is able to sup-
port thousands of sensors, in comparison to the normal IP-based
protocols, which have a limited range. Low power IEEE 802.11
uses chips that are optimized for low power consumption, espe-
cially when the device is on standby mode. Powerline Commu-
nication (PLC) systems (IEEE 1901) exploit conductors used
for electric power transmission for data transmission. Radio-
frequency identification (RFID) technology includes a small RF
transmitter and receiver, that usually operate at a low frequency
and are mainly used for identifying or tracking objects [19].
There are two basic categories: the IP-based and the non IP-
based objects. The IP based objects normally have high capa-
bilities and are able to connect to the Internet by running op-
erating systems and they only have energy and memory con-
straints for supporting the TCP/IP protocol. Sensors have nat-
ural limitations such as limited energy resources, low memory
and processing capability, which make them difficult to provide
full IP protocol stack support. For that reason, suitable OSs
have been developed for tiny embedded systems and sensors
with limited requirements such as Contiki, TinyOS and FreeR-
TOS [20, 21, 22, 23]. For the connectivity and communication
of non-IP objects, protocols, such as ZigBee [18] have been
developed for short-range low-power and low bit-rate radios
and sensors. Non IP-based devices such as RFID tags can be:
(i) passive, which do not incorporate a power supply, because
the electrical power induced by the reader is enough to trans-
mit data, or (ii) active, which use their own battery for data
transmissions [24]. The main disadvantage of the non IP-based
sensors is the lack of network connectivity without the need of
gateways
2.2. Interconnecting smart objects with the Internet of Things
One of the most important pillars of Future Networks is the
Internet of Things (IoT), which has attracted many supporters in
the research community and industry. The European Commis-
sion has made a deal of great effort to fund project proposals,
especially in the 7th Framework Programme, related to the IoT
and Future Networks [25]. The term IoT was coined in 1999
by Kevin Ashton [26] with the vision of interconnecting previ-
ously unconnected and isolated objects to the Internet. The IoT
has the potential to be incorporated into the network devices
with minimal capabilities like smart objects. Moreover, the IoT
aims to connect not only things but also networks as well, cre-
ating “networks of networks”. For instance, such a network
of networks could be a small sensor network connected with
wireless access points managed by a mobile smart-phone. Col-
lected data can be added to a database, in which remote devices
may interact. IoT is able to interconnect wireless sensor net-
works, telemetry, embedded systems, mobile telephony, com-
puter networking, mobile computing and ubiquitous computing
[20]. There are two ways for a node to be attached to an IoT
network: (i) by using a IoT gateway and (ii) by direct contact
with other smart objects, using a communication interface such
as ZigBee.
The three most important characteristics of IoT are: (i) the
ability to instrument ordinary objects with a chip and a com-
munication device, (ii) the interconnection capability, and (iii)
a way to provide intelligent services. One critical challenge
is to combine heterogeneous IP or non IP-based objects under
the same network and connect them to the global Internet. The
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) [27] and the IPSO Al-
liance [3] with the support of companies such as Cisco, Erics-
son, Oracle, Intel, Google and Motorola, aim to standardize IP
(and more specifically IPv6) for embedded systems in order to
homogenize heterogeneous smart objects. The incompatibility
between smart devices and their supported technologies, espe-
cially in different layers, leads to difficulties in their collabora-
tion, as well as in their secure and trustworthy interdependence
with their environment and logged in followers.
2.3. Life-logging
The main concept of life-logging improves the way people
record and exchange their data, communicate with others and
log into applications or devices. Since ancient times, people
used to keep records of their everyday life and their personal
activities within a community. Calendars, books, diaries, let-
ters and paintings can be added to the catalogue of life-logging
devices. Over the last century new forms of life-logging data
were added to the above list such as photos, sounds and videos.
Especially in the ’80s decade, the broad propagation of per-
sonal computers gave humans the opportunity to keep records
and personalize their environment to bring interfaces closer to
their personal preferences, accounts and applications. At the
end of the ’90s decade and the begin of 21st century, especially
with the widespread adoption of the Internet, personal data such
as email accounts, gaming data, login accounts, favorite web
pages, documents, digital photo albums, online web services
and applications were stored in personal devices. In the 21st
century, social networks have attracted a great number of users
keen to be life-logged (Figure 2).
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Figure 2: Life-logging in history
The increasing amount of life-logged data and the need to
integrate it has been one of the main issues of IoT in the last
decade. Authors in [28] analyzed in 2004 the usage of life-
logging activities for different applications and media such as
sending and receiving emails, TV programs, GPS records, vis-
ited web pages and photographs, focusing on the problem of
combining life-log activities from different media types. A
few years ago, someone could have only a couple of network-
connected devices compared to today and the near future when
each person will have access to and control quite more network-
connected devices. The need to connect, manage and interact
with a plethora of devices means having a life-account in which
it is possible to connect to different applications and accounts.
Social networks have attracted a great number of computer-
connected users who share similar concerns, ideas, personal
moments, photos, achievements, news and data. One step fur-
ther is the possibility of managing these data in a centralized
or a distributed base by interacting with the smart environment.
There are a number of examples of life-logging on smart de-
vices such as the use of smart phones to check emails, the key
to unlock your car, the device to open your garage door or a
RFID card needed to enter the entrance of an office or lab.
A life-logging experience of interacting with devices is a
daily issue for a variety of people. The scenario of [29], in
which a runner with a heart rate sensor and a pedometer, records
his data and transfer them through his WiFi-connected iPod to
a web database in which his friend have access, is not a future
scenario but is already reality. The increasing use and need for
personal smart devices such as sensors and actuators indoor or
outdoor create the need to develop applications with which a
user may interact under the prism of the IoT. Whereas a couple
of years ago smart phones were not affordable for many people,
they now have a widespread penetration into the market with a
variety of developed applications with interconnected capabil-
ities in different environments. A very interesting framework
platform for Android phones has been developed by Google un-
der the Tungsten Project with the name Android at Home [30]
in which IoT is applied for allowing individual users to log into
their accounts and control their smart objects at home. Google’s
next challenge is the addition of ”Android at Home” in Google
Plus where life-logging in social networks will fulfill the inter-
section with smart objects and the IoT.
3. Security threats in smart environments
Security is assumed to be one of the key issues of smart en-
vironments. Not only is it critical for the connected devices and
users but it is also dangerous for the gateways that are connected
to them. The issue for security and emergency response in mis-
sion critical communications and infrastructure is always an im-
portant topic especially for mobile ad-hoc networks [31, 32]. In
addition, military applications, factories and industries, bridges,
medical and health and environmental applications are some
examples where security threats should be taken into consid-
eration. Moreover, the widespread use of smart objects in the
home environment endangers disclosing private data. For in-
stance, a wireless installed camera, for recording possible in-
truders, connected to an insecure home network could be a sus-
ceptible threat to disclose the private actions of a family. The
fast growth of life-logging applications and the potential for
integrating them into smart environments mandated that secu-
rity issues need to be addressed. Secure and trustworthy life-
logging in smart environments involves challenges, risks and
threats on the communication layer under the IoT and finally
on the end-users who log on and interchange data with their
smart objects.
The general concept of CIA triad (Confidentiality, Integrity
and Availability) supported by [20] and [33] can be applied suc-
cessfully for the security of smart environments. Confidentiality
focuses on keeping information private by encrypting it or en-
suring that only the right people will have access to it. Integrity
confirms that data has not been modified. Integrity is achieved
by the use of Message Integrity Codes (MICs) or Message Au-
thentication Codes (MACs). Finally, availability, guarantees
that information is available when it is needed.
3.1. Security vulnerabilities and attacks in smart objects and
the IoT
Smart objects, particularly sensor networks, are vulnerable
by their very nature because of the lack of security support in
the primary design of low lossy networks. Their previous status
did not face the need to ensure secure transmissions. Informa-
tion about measurements such as temperature and humidity is
not so attractive for attackers. Nevertheless, the rapid growth
of system automation, the massive production of sensors and
smart devices and their integration in the smart environments
reveal security deficits and raises possible threats from mali-
cious users. Security add-on features in an insecure design
cannot replace the capabilities of a securely designed network.
Moreover, the limited resources of smart objects in terms of
memory, CPU and energy make the inclusion of add-on secu-
rity features even harder.
Security threats on smart objects do not vary much compared
to normal wireless or wired networks. The main difference is
that suitable security mechanisms are absent because of the lack
of respective architectures and resources. The adversary model
of life-logging involves stealing personal data, impersonating
or launching DoS attacks. This model exists all over the Inter-
net, irrespectively of the connection technology. Since smart
objects are usually equipped with one wireless communication
radio, respective security challenges are mostly compared to the
wireless networks. Such security challenges exist in all differ-
ent layers of OSI model [34] but the main difference of wireless
networks to the wired ones is the medium. At the physical layer
the most critical dangers involve eavesdropping, impersonating
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in a secure or insecure communication channel and jamming
attacks [33].
Security and privacy are critical points in sensors and actu-
ators. A malicious node can easily intercept transmitted infor-
mation or impersonate a receiver. Furthermore, privacy seems
to be quite challenging because of the inability of the sensors
to anticipate and sense possible eavesdroppers. If the messages
exchanged between the nodes have a MIC in the headers and
payload, it is impossible for an attacker to launch a success-
ful impersonation attack but it is possible to become a passive
listener or launch Denial of Service (DoS) attack. On the other
hand, if the payload message is encrypted then a malicious node
that has the encryption key can launch an impersonation attack
but not to become a passive listener. The disclosure of sensi-
tive information about the location, track and identity of a user
may cause significant problems for him and his interconnected
network and users.
Authentication is a very important issue that is missing in
many objects. Trusted Platform Computing (TPM) imple-
mented in laptops is difficult to be applied because of the lack
of suitable cryptographic algorithms developed for lightweight
smart devices. Moreover, lack of authentication, encryption or
integrity on the interconnected objects raises serious consider-
ations. The Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol and the
Secure Socket Layer (SSL) protocol appear to be efficient cryp-
tographic solutions but they cannot be easily applied because of
the resource-constraints of the smart objects. The low process-
ing mechanisms for data mining and services capable for au-
thenticity, confidentiality and privacy of devices raise security
issues and threats for revealing sensitive information to insecure
devices and storages.
Low networking capabilities in bandwidth, throughput and
data rate along with the minimal computation power for real
time aggregations and buffering, which are needed for secure
networking, make the smart objects susceptible to attacks at the
network layer. At the MAC layer security issues occur due to
collisions and channel occupations, which may disable trans-
mission opportunities for some users, exhausting the batteries
of the devices in parallel. At the physical layer jamming, DoS,
traffic analysis, injection and tampering are very serious secu-
rity threats for smart objects. Especially, the inability of many
objects to acquire IP addresses makes them vulnerable to at-
tacks (such as DoS) that in powerful IP hardware devices, run-
ning efficient security protocols, can be avoided successfully.
Finally, the topology in a IoT multi-hop and multi-route
domain is completely different that in the traditional Internet
where service providers route and manage the traffic, avoiding
malicious attacks and securing not only specific computers but
also the whole network. These issues seem to be challenging
for the IoT domains where there is no central control of the net-
works. The lack of IP for a number of smart objects raises secu-
rity issues on the routing protocols where black holes, spoofing,
forwarding and sinkholes attacks are launched.
3.2. Security challenges due to limited resources and energy
constraints of smart objects
The tiny capabilities of smart objects in terms of computa-
tional power, memory and energy create difficulties in applying
well-established security protocols. Smart objects and sensors
are vulnerable to attacks because of the lack of security support
in the primary design of low lossy networks. The most crit-
ical factor for secure communication between smart objects is
the required energy. Mechanisms for mitigating security threats
result in consuming more energy form their already limited en-
ergy resources. Nevertheless, if no security encryption exists,
a malicious node can easily intercept transmitted information
or impersonate a receiver. Furthermore, privacy seems to be
challenging because of the smart objects’ weakness to antici-
pate and sense possible listeners. However, the use of AES-
128 (Advanced Encryption Standard) link-layer security mech-
anism of IEEE 802.15.4 seems to have lightweight properties
but the necessary time to encrypt and decrypt interchanging
messages increases significantly the energy consumption. The
encryption algorithm used in 802.15.4 is AES with a 128b key
length (16 Bytes). Moreover AES algorithm is not only used
to encrypt the information but to validate the sent data. This
concept is called Data Integrity and it is achieved using a MIC
(or a MAC) which is appended to the message. This code en-
sures the integrity of the MAC header and the attached payload
data. On the other hand, jamming attacks can be detected using
suitable algorithms based on dropped packets or the decrease of
the signal to noise ratio [35]. In order to mitigate such attacks,
two possible solutions may be applied: (i) an increase in the
power level or (ii) a channel assignment procedure as described
in [36]. The use of both mitigating factors severely affects the
energy consumed in smart objects, as will be described exten-
sively in the next sections.
3.3. Risks and security issues of life-logging
The trend of life-logging encounters a number of security is-
sues which need to be resolved in order to step forward into the
interconnected world and the Future Internet. To highlight the
benefits and the risks of life-logging, authors in [32] present a
future scenario in which they detail benefits, challenges, risks
and threats of life-logging in real life. The scenario occurs in
3-5 years from now when the members of a family live in an
integrated smart world in which life and objects have acquired
a stable and tailored relationship. Several possible risks and
threats are depicted in this scenario involving life-logging in a
variety of activities, services and devices. Social networking, as
a part of their lifestyle and as a tool for socializing or for work,
has substantially enhanced the virtual reality in a cyber space
world.
There are several security threats that could arise from life-
logging in the Internet. Authors in [37] address the most com-
mon life-logging security and privacy risks, including: (i) the
surveillance of someone’s life, (ii) memory hazards, meaning
that mistakes in life can not be forgotten easily, (iii) long term
availability of personal information, even if his life and ideol-
ogy has changed, and (iv) the problem of stolen life-log infor-
mation. Moreover, the danger of a lost password or a stolen
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one, is believed to be one of the most serious threats for most
people. Such an incident could enable an attacker to gain ac-
cess to a person’s accounts, starting from his social networking
profile or emails, up to his bank account.
Life-logging from a computer or a laptop on to the Internet
differs from life-logging in a smart environment because of the
unsolved security threats which occur in the unsafe smart en-
vironments. Secure life-logging in smart environments is rela-
tively straightforward compared to the security of smart objects
and the IoT. As discussed in previously, there are many vulner-
abilities in a heterogeneous ecosystem in which every device
faces different challenges in security and privacy. The discrep-
ancy between technologies and the attempt to interconnect them
have brought new security challenges and gaps which need to
be filled.
4. Defining a lightweight framework
The increasing trend for the addition of life-logging appli-
cations into the smart environment and the discussed security
threats require efficient countermeasures to ensure security, pri-
vacy and trustworthiness in life-logging applications. The key
way to overcome these constraints is the development of a
lightweight framework for ensuring security, privacy and trust-
worthy life-logging in smart environments. We describe the
basic pillars of this framework including the use of lightweight
versions of IP protocols, privacy by design and cryptography.
4.1. Lightweight IP protocols for securing smart objects
Security threats in life-logging under a smart environment
and the IoT occur mainly because of the lack of suitable secu-
rity protocols. Considering smart objects’ limited capabilities,
proper algorithms and techniques need to be implemented in
order to achieve maximum security and privacy. The IPSO Al-
liance advocates the use of the IP protocol for establishing a
secure exchange of data. In order to achieve security in smart
objects, the IPv6 over Low power Wireless Personal Area Net-
works (6lowPAN) protocol is proposed [38]. Smart objects are
able to connect throughout the lightweight 6lowPan protocol
which gains its advantage from the use of AES-128 link-layer
security mechanism of IEEE 802.15.4. However, the IP frag-
mentation allows the use of available buffer from malicious
users to send large or invalid packets. Even if in the trans-
port layer 6lowPAN is shown to have efficiency, in the network
layer, Internet Protocol Security (IPsec) and Secure Neighbor
Discovery (SEND) appear to be more suitable to attain network
security in IPv6 [39]. Authors in [40] suggest a security adap-
tation layer to overcome security issues when connecting the
IoT network to the Internet. The adaptation layer is based on
one similar to the 6lowPAN concept or IPv6 in which gateways
connected to different domains are able to translate standard IP
security protocols to domain-specific protocols variants.
4.2. Lightweight design for ensuring privacy
Privacy is a major concept of life-logging especially in inse-
cure smart environments in which a variety of data from users
and devices are exchanged and collected. The massive produc-
tion and transfer of sensitive data such as personal photos, mes-
sages and videos encounter the danger of disclosure. In order to
ensure privacy on smart environments the principles of privacy
should be applied in a lightweight privacy by design approach.
The basic principles for ensuring privacy in smart environments
of life-logging are detailed in [41]:
• Openness is established when recorded data are transpar-
ent and no secret data are stored.
• Participation of Individuals ensures that records are avail-
able to them.
• Limits of Recorded and Appropriate Data have to be as-
signed for specific applications.
• Data Quality of recorded data should be related and accu-
rate to the application.
• Limits of Use indicates that records should be used only by
authorized users and for an assessed purpose.
• Personal data should be Secured Appropriately on storage
devices.
• Accountability of record keepers has to be ensured.
• The last principle which should be emphasized is Aware-
ness from the user point of view.
Since privacy is not a convenient issue to be resolved, espe-
cially in smart environments, the principles of privacy should
be implemented under an international framework and stan-
dards. Smart environments (more precisely the IoT) should be
designed under the concept of Privacy by Design (PbD) defined
by Ann Cavoukia [42] who suggested that privacy should be
embedded into the design of technologies ensuring privacy and
control over one’s information and not solely by compliance
with regulatory frameworks.
4.3. Lightweight cryptography for trustworthy life-logging in
smart environments
Cryptography is considered as a key element for trustworthy
transactions in smart environments. One of the most important
issues in life-logging is the users’ authentication and their de-
vices connected to the IoT. For establishing authentication and
authorization in the IoT the use of Lightweight Cryptography
(LWC) is crucial. The LWC algorithms and protocols have been
designed especially for constrained environments where the re-
sources are limited such as in RFIDs, Sensors, tags, smart cards
etc. Based on [43], the proposed lightweight cryptography is
supported for two main reasons: for the efficiency of end-to-
end communication and for the applicability to lower resource
devices. Constraints of low resource devices, such as battery
limitations and narrow computation power, require lightweight
symmetric key cryptography to decrease power consumption of
devices. Moreover, the footprint of LWC primitives is smaller
compared to the conventional ones. Even though it is possible
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for some nodes to store footprints in memory and run cryp-
tographic algorithms, it is crucial the low-power and low-cost
devices to embed applications instead of hardware circuitry be-
cause of the limited resources of smart objects. Symmetric and
asymmetric key cryptography can apply lightweight properties
for trustworthy life-logging in the IoT.
Symmetric Key Cryptography can be separated into three cat-
egories: (i) block ciphers, (ii) stream ciphers and (iii) hash func-
tions. Block ciphers with lightweight properties have been pro-
posed for AES and Data Encryption Standard (DES) such as
CLEFIA [44] and PRESENT [45]. Stream cipher algorithms
with lightweight properties have been proposed and developed
in the ECTRYP II eSTREAM portfolio [46]. The hash al-
gorithm SHA-3 [47] do not satisfy lightweight requirements.
Lightweight hash functions are possible to construct based on
lightweight block ciphers.
Asymmetric Key Cryptography is difficult to be implemented
because the amount of data for public key cryptography in smart
objects is much larger than in symmetric key cryptography. Ef-
ficient security such as Rivest Shamir Adleman (RSA) and El-
liptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) cannot be implemented ef-
ficiently in smart objects because of the limitations for storing
additional footprints. ECC is more likely to be implemented be-
cause of its smaller operand lengths and relatively lower com-
putational requirements [48]. Nevertheless, it is possible to im-
plement public key cryptography in smart environments but it
is difficult to execute in reasonable time.
Considering the major need for authentication and authoriza-
tion for users and devices in smart environments, cryptography
will always be a challenge. Well-established or new algorithms
may well have to be implemented efficiently in order to over-
come the limitations of smart objects with lightweight capabil-
ities. However, as strong as the cryptographic algorithms are,
they will never get over the vulnerability of an insecure or inex-
pert user with a lack of basic security and privacy precautions.
5. Experimental investigations on energy consumption for
secure life-logging
To investigate the impact of security attacks on energy con-
sumption, an experimental test-bed was developed. The topol-
ogy of the model consists of three users: (i) Bob, (ii) Alice
and (iii) Eve. Bob and Alice are interconnected each with a
smart device. The life-logging procedure is applied to their
communication in which they share data, personal preferences
and habits. The transmitted information may be sensitive, like
security codes or personal data and secrets. Under this com-
munication model, an attacker (Eve) appears to have as main
target to break any available security wall and steal users’ per-
sonal data or destroy the communication.
5.1. Test-bed description
The test-bed contains three users each one equipped with a
smart device. Bob and Alice are connected each with a Digi
XBee Pro 802.15.4 device [49]. Both devices are connected
(through their serial cable) with Matlab 2011b on a Windows
XP management server. Suitable algorithms have been devel-
oped in order to satisfy the communication model. To measure
the energy consumption of XBee a True-RMS polymeter with
USB output was used for storing the current measurements of
each experiment connected serially with Matlab as well. Eve is
a malicious user which acts as an eavesdropper or as an attacker.
This node is emulated with a Universal Software Radio Periph-
eral (USRP2) device from Ettus Research LLC [50] holding
a XCVR2450 Dual-band Transceiver interchangeable daugh-
terboard module that serves as the RF front end. The GNU
Radio 3.3 software is installed for creating complex software-
defined radio systems [51]. The GNU Radio software is in-
stalled on a Ubuntu 11.04 which manages the attack node. The
IEEE 802.15.4 PHY implementation as well as UCLA Zigbee
[52] GNU Radio extension was installed to capture and decode
802.15.4 messages. Jamming attacks are implemented using
GNU Radio signal generator. Finally, the attacker model al-
gorithms were implemented by the use of shell scripts. The
described test-bed topology is depicted in Figure 3.
EveManagement 2
Management 1
Alice
Polymeter
Bob
Figure 3: Test-bed topology
5.2. Energy consumption calculator
The experimental approach of this investigation has as a main
object to measure the energy consumption of smart objects. For
that reason, an application in Matlab was developed for real
time energy consumption measurements. The polymeter de-
vice, serially connected with the computer and theMatlab, mea-
sures the electric current of connected devices, such as XBee
modules. The developed tool is generic enough so that it can
be used for a variety of consumed energy experiments and not
only for the current one. It can plot (at real-time) four different
kinds of measurements such as the electric current (in Ambere),
the consumed power (in Watt), the consumed energy (in Watt-
Hour) and the total sum of consumed energy (in Watt-Hour).
One of the key features used to evaluate the described exper-
iments, is its capability to record measured data for plotting
them later. The described tool is depicted in Figure 4.
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Figure 4: Consumed energy calculator
5.3. Communication model
The main concept of this model focuses on mitigating se-
curity threats and attacks. In the specific model Bob acts as
the coordinator and Alice as the end-user. In the first phase of
the process, Bob and Alice assign the default identical options
in power level and transmission channel without any security
in order to consume the minimum amount of energy. When
they start to interchange messages, if they anticipate dropped
packets, they increase the power level to mitigate the issue.
Power level cannot totally solve the problem if an attacker ap-
plies severe jamming attacks or if the channel is occupied by
another transmission. For that reason Bob applies an energy
detection scan to detect the most energy-free channel, inform-
ing Alice about the new channel. If an attacker exists, then he
may identify the new communication channel, starting to jam
the new channel. Bob will continue to apply energy detection
techniques every time there are dropped packets until the users
interchange the number of data they have to. This procedure in-
corporates the danger of disclosing personal data if there is no
security on their transmission if an eavesdropper exists. Bob,
being the coordinator, decides to enable the AES encryption on
their data. So he requests Alice to enable the security option
decrypting their messages with a pre-shared AES-128 key. The
necessary computational power to decrypt and encrypt mes-
sages delay the procedure therefore the time to exchange the
same number of messages is greater, increasing the required
amount of energy. If the attacker cannot decode the messages,
he will again start to apply jamming attacks causing dropped
packets. Power level and channel assignment procedures will
have to be followed again in order to mitigate the attack. These
communication model scenarios, as described, are presented in
Figure 5.
5.4. Attacker model
One of the most important parts of this investigation is based
on a smart attacker. The main concept of the attacker is to break
any security constraints of the communication between Alice
and Bob. The first step is to identify the transmission channel.
For that reason the 802.15.4 PHY multi-channel implementa-
tion was used. Under this procedure the attacker (Eve) scans the
available channels until she finds the specific transmitted chan-
nel. The next step is to try to decode the transmitted 802.15.4
packets. Two possible scenarios may happen. The first is when
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the communication between the users is without any AES-128
encryption, so the attacker is able to decode encrypted mes-
sages. The second case is when Bob and Alice share a prede-
fined AES key. In this scenario if the attacker has stolen the
shared key, she is able to decode the messages. If she does
not hold the key, she can destroy the transmission by apply-
ing a jamming attack on the specific channel. When Bob and
Alice anticipate a jamming attack, they change channel. In this
case the attacker applies a multi-channel scan until she finds the
transmitted channel. Finally, a malicious person can always ap-
ply jamming attacks independently whether there is encryption
or not. Figure 6 depicts the flowchart model of the attacker.
EVE
AES-128 
Encryption
Enable
Yes
AES-128 
Encryption Key 
Revealed
Yes
Decode 
Messages with 
Encryption Key
Jamming Attack on 
specific channel
802.15.4 Phy 
Multi -Channel Scan
Decode 
Messages
Assign 
Channel 
802.15.4 Phy 
decoder
No
No
Figure 6: The attacker flowchart model
6. Performance evaluation
In this section the results from real experiments analyzing
the security risks and emphasizing the energy consumption are
presented. Different scenarios are presented in which the en-
ergy consumption is measured. The main concept involves the
exchange of information and data between Alice and Bob ei-
ther insecure or secure. The case in which a smart attacker
(Eve) tries to steal exchanging data or to destroy the traffic, is
investigated. Three different scenarios are presented to prove
the vulnerabilities based on the energy consumption of differ-
ent attack models. The maximum packet size in IEEE 802.15.4
standard (including the frame overhead which is 25 bytes) is
127 bytes or 102 bytes maximum data length [53]. Therefore,
in the following experiments Bob sends to Alice 1000 packets
of 102 bytes data length. The polymeter stores electric current
and these values are used as the main measurements for this in-
vestigation. The power consumption is measured in watts (1)
and in watt-hour (2).
P = VI. (1)
WH =
∫ t
0
VIdt =
n∑
i=1
1
2
(ViIi + Vi−1Ii−1)(ti − ti−1). (2)
Where P is the consumed electric power in Watts, WH is the
consumed electric power Watt-Hour, V is the Voltage, I is the
consumed Current and t is the time.
6.1. Transmission without attack
The first phase of this scenario includes the communication
between Bob and Alice without any security encryption focus-
ing on the power consumption on different power levels for each
smart device. Bob transmits a packet to Alice who returns it
back. The counter calculates the number of transmitted packets
over the received ones. When there are dropped packets due to
the distance of the users, the power level is increased. When
there is a successful transmission Bob sends a new message
to Alice. This scenario is applied to show the basic commu-
nication model. Under this model Eve is able to decode the
exchanged messages as was described in the previous section
by using the 802.15.4 PHY extension. Even if the users spend
the minimum of the energy on this experiment the communi-
cation involves many security and privacy issues. Under this
scenario an energy consumption investigation was carried out,
measuring the different power levels of the modules.
The second phase of this scenario occurs when Alice and
Bob become aware of the security level of their communica-
tion. They decide to decode their messages using AES-128 en-
cryption. The result of exchanging information with AES en-
cryption is the delay of transmitted data. This can be explained
because of the limited computational power of XBee to encode
and decode messages. The comparison of Figure 7a and 7b
shows that the required time to transmit the same number of
packets is 36% greater when AES encryption is enabled.
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(b) with AES Encryption
 
 
Idle Power Level 0 Power Level 1 Power Level 2 Power Level 3 Power Level 4
Figure 7: Energy consumption for different power levels (a) without AES en-
cryption and (b) with AES encryption
6.2. Channel assignment on jamming attack
In the second scenario, the users realize that there are
dropped packets in their communication due to the interference
caused by external transmissions. This may happen when the
channel is occupied or when a jamming attack occurs. Interfer-
ence is reasonable since the XBee 802.15.4 uses the free band of
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2.4GHz which shares the same band as the popular 802.11. The
users apply the previously described communication model, in
which, when dropped packets are anticipated, an energy detec-
tion process for finding the most suitable energy-free channel
is executed. The attack model of Eve will observe that there is
no transmission on the previously occupied channel but a new
channel has been assigned. The next step is to detect the new
channel and continue the attacks on the new channel. This loop
will continue until Bob and Alice complete the number of pack-
ets that they want to transmit.
The second phase on this scenario describes the case in which
Alice and Bob exchange messages with AES encryption. Since
it is not possible for Eve to listen and decode interchanging
messages her efforts focus on destroying the communication
link. For this purpose a jamming attack is launched. This phase
follows the same procedure as the first phase of this scenario
but there is more delay for the transmission of 1000 packets be-
cause of the computation time to decrypt and encrypt messages.
Figure 8 presents the comparison of energy consumption with-
out and with AES encryption on different power levels.
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Figure 8: Energy consumption: channel assignment on jamming attack (a)
without AES encryption and (b) with AES encryption
6.3. Power increase and channel assignment on jamming at-
tack
The third scenario is similar with the previous scenario but
the coordinator is able to execute an increment in the power
level when there are 10 dropped packets on their devices. If the
problem of dropped packets continues, a channel assignment
procedure is applied. The gradual increase in the power level
and the channel assignment procedure result to higher energy
consumption. As the power increases, the energy consumption
becomes higher. If the level of power reaches its maximum
value, the coordinator applies a channel assignment. When the
new channel is assigned, the power level is decreased to its min-
imum value. In Figure 9 the energy consumption on jamming,
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Figure 9: Energy consumption: power increment and channel assignment on
jamming attack (a) without AES encryption and (b) with AES encryption
with and without AES encryption, is depicted. The graph shows
the gradual increment of power until the nodes reach the max-
imum power level; so a new channel assignment is occurred
decreasing the transmission power level to the minimum level
in parallel.
Figure 10: Energy consumption in milliWatt-Hour for different power levels
(PL) of the three scenarios
6.4. A comparison of the experimental results
A comparison of consumed energy from all the previous sce-
narios in milliWatt-Hour is presented in Figure 10. For all the
scenarios, there is an increment of about 15-30% when AES
encryption is enabled compared with the transmission without
AES encryption on the same power level and scenario. More-
over, for the first scenario the consumed energy is increased
about 4% on each power level rise. For the second scenario,
there is a rise of about 10% between minimum and maximum
power level when channel assignment is occurred on jamming
attacks. As it can be seen from the graph, the maximum con-
sumed energy is needed for the second scenario (maximum
power level, AES and channel assignment to mitigate jamming
attacks) and the minimum consumed energy is needed for the
first scenario (minimum power level, no AES, no jamming at-
tack). The increment of the consumed energy is about 230%.
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This final conclusion proves the value of this research concern-
ing the correlation of security in addition with the energy con-
sumption.
6.5. Evaluation of the experiments and future work
The experimental evaluation of this study has shown many
valuable conclusions. The limited capabilities of smart devices
severely affect the performance of the security framework. Es-
pecially the limitation in energy is assumed to be one of the
most important issues for the smart objects especially if they
run over batteries. The chosen method, measuring the electric
current, proved to be the most proper and simpler way to mea-
sure the energy consumption. This method includes all the pa-
rameters which affect the performance of devices. Single mea-
surements such as monitoring the CPU usage or memory use
cannot reflect exactly the total consumed energy of the mod-
ules. Therefore, the developed setup was necessary in order to
measure the consumed energy.
This research work has proved the prior assumption concern-
ing the impact on energy consumption in smart objects due to
different security mechanisms such as power control, encryp-
tion and channel assignment to mitigate passive listening and
jamming attacks. Even if the experiments were done for spe-
cific devices such as XBee Pro, the same architecture can be
used in order to measure energy consumption for a variety of
different devices which mitigate attacks. The percentage of the
effect may vary but the consumed energy will be increased.
Nevertheless, the results are relative not only to the assigned
parameters but also to the test-bed setup which is affected by
the software used, operating systems and algorithms and the at-
tempt to interconnect the plethora of different devices, software
and algorithms. Much time was spent in the development of
the communication model, the attacker model and the test-bed
in order to be able to evaluate real experimental results. How-
ever, the development of such a setup will give the potential for
further investigation, experiments, using a variety of different
devices so as to construct a lightweight, energy efficient frame-
work for secure life-logging in smart environments.
7. Conclusion
In this paper the topic of life-logging in smart environ-
ments was presented, giving details about the smart objets and
their potential for interconnection in the Internet of Things do-
main. The plethora of smart objects and their connection with
life-logging applications have raised new issues and security
threats. Security challenges appear due to the lack of suitable
security mechanisms and protocols in the Internet of Things be-
cause of the limited resources of smart objects. To overcome
considerations in security, privacy and trustworthy life-logging,
a lightweight framework was described. Furthermore, an ex-
perimental investigation on the energy consumption for secure
life-logging in smart environments was described. The grow-
ing development of smart devices and their broad use by users
has lead to new security challenges including not only secu-
rity issues but in privacy as well. One of the most important
restrictions in securing the communication on these devices is
the limited resources. Under these conditions a communication
model, an attacker model and an experimental test-bed were
developed to investigate the consumed energy under different
scenarios. The specifications of the users were defined in order
to be able to mitigate eavesdropper’s attacks of passive listeners
and jamming attacks. The research has shown there is a great
influence on the energy consumed to secure such attacks. A
smart attacker was designed to break any security walls of such
a communication. The conclusions of this investigation have
shown weaknesses in this situation, increasing the need to se-
cure life-logging in smart environments while overcoming the
energy constraints.
References
[1] Nikolaos E. Petroulakis, Ioannis Askoxylakis, and Theo Tryfonas. Life-
logging in Smart Environments: Challenges and Security Threats. In the
2012 IEEE ICC Workshop on Convergence among Heterogeneous Wire-
less Systems in Future Internet (ConWire), Ottava, Canada, June 2012.
[2] Nikolaos E. Petroulakis, Elias Z. Tragos, and Ioannis G. Askoxylakis.
An Experimental Investigation on Energy Consumption for Secure Life-
logging in Smart Environments. In the IEEE International Workshop on
Computer-Aided Modeling Analysis and Design of Communication Links
and Networks (CAMAD), Barcelona, Spain, September 2012.
[3] IPSO Alliance. Enabling the Internet of Things, www.ipso-alliance.org,
2011.
[4] E Shi and A Perrig. Designing secure sensor networks. Wireless Commu-
nications, IEEE, (December):38–43, 2004.
[5] David Boyle and Thomas Newe. Securing wireless sensor networks: se-
curity architectures. Journal of Networks, 3(1):65–77, 2008.
[6] RSJ Reyes, JCMonje, and MEC Santos. Implementation of Zigbee-based
and ISM-based wireless sensor and actuator network with throughput,
power and cost comparisons. WSEAS TRANSACTIONS on COMMUNI-
CATIONS, 9(7):395–405, 2010.
[7] Javier Alonso and Sergio Go´mez. Experimental Measurements of the
Power Consumption forWireless Sensor Networks. Internal Report UPC,
June, pages 1–14, 2006.
[8] Incheol Shin, Yilin Shen, Ying Xuan, MT Thai, and T Znati. Reactive
jamming attacks in multi-radio wireless sensor networks: an efficient mit-
igating measure by identifying trigger nodes. FOWANC09, pages 87–96,
2009.
[9] V. Bhuse, a. Gupta, and a. Al-Fuqaha. Detection of Masquerade Attacks
on Wireless Sensor Networks. 2007 IEEE International Conference on
Communications, pages 1142–1147, June 2007.
[10] E Bayraktaroglu, C King, and X Liu. On the Performance of IEEE 802.11
under Jamming. Infocom/08, 2008.
[11] Liran Ma, AY Teymorian, and Xiuzhen Cheng. Passive listening and
intrusion management in commodity wi-fi networks. GLOBECOM’07.
IEEE, 2007.
[12] Alexandros G Fragkiadakis, Elias Z Tragos, Theo Tryfonas, and Ioan-
nis G Askoxylakis. Design and performance evaluation of a lightweight
wireless early warning intrusion detection prototype. EURASIP Journal
on Wireless Communications and Networking, 2012(1):73, 2012.
[13] VA Siris and M Delakis. Interference-aware channel assignment in a
metropolitan multi-radio wireless mesh network with directional anten-
nas. Computer Communications, 2011. Query date: 2012-10-13.
[14] IBM. Smart Planet, http://www.ibm.com/smarterplanet.
[15] Cisco. Smart+connected communities, changing a city, a country, the
world, 2010.
[16] N. Gershenfeld. When Things Start to Think. Owl Books, 2000.
[17] P. Wetterwald. Promoting the use of IP in networks of Smart Objects.
ETSI M2M Workshop, 2010.
[18] ZigBee Alliance. www.zigbee.org.
[19] et al. Vasseur, JP. A survey of several low power Link layers for IP Smart
Objects. IPSO Alliance, 2010.
[20] J.P. Vasseur and A. Dunkels. Interconnecting Smart Objects with IP: The
Next Internet. Morgan Kaufmann Publishers Inc., 2010.
11
[21] TinyOS. www.tinyos.net.
[22] FreetOS. www.freertos.org.
[23] Contici-OS. www.contiki-os.org.
[24] R. Tesoriero, J.A. Gallud, M. Lozano, and V.M.R. Penichet. Using active
and passive RFID technology to support indoor location-aware systems.
ICCE, 2008.
[25] Internet of Things and Future Internet Enterprise Systems,
http://cordis.europa.eu/fp7/ict/enet/.
[26] K. Ashton. That ’Internet of Things’ Thing. RFID Journal, 2009.
[27] IETF. The Internet Engineering Task Force, http://www.ietf.org/ .
[28] T. Ushiama and T. Watanabe. A Life-Log Search Model Based on
Bayesian Network. ISMSE, 2004.
[29] A. Manfred. Security in the Internet of Things. RFIDsec Asia, 2010.
[30] P. Wetterwald. Android@home. Google I/O developer conference, 2011.
[31] Alexandros G Fragkiadakis, Ioannis G Askoxylakis, Elias Z Tragos, and
Christos V Verikoukis. Ubiquitous robust communications for emergency
response using multi-operator heterogeneous networks. EURASIP Jour-
nal on Wireless Communications and Networking, 2011(1):13, 2011.
[32] I. Askoxylakis, I. Brown, P. Dickman, M. Friedewald, K. Irion, E. Kosta,
M. Langheinrich, P. McCarthy, D. Osimo, S. Papiotis, A. Pasic,
M. Petkovic, B. Price, S. Spiekermann, and D. Wright. TO L0G OR
NOT TO L0G ? Risks and benefits of emerging life-logging applications.
ENISA, 2011.
[33] K. Stammberger, M. Semp, M. B. Anand, and D. Culler. Introduction to
Security for Smart Object Networks. IPSO Alliance, 2010.
[34] IOS/IEO Commission. Information technology - Open Systems Intercon-
nection - Basic Reference Model: The Basic Model. ISO/IEC, 1994.
[35] A. Fragkiadakis, V. Siris, and N. Petroulakis. Anomaly-based intrusion
detection algorithms for wireless networks. In the 8th WWIC 2010, June
2010.
[36] N. Petroulakis, M. Delakis, M. Genetzakis, T. Dionysiou, S. Papadakis,
and V.A. Siris. Demonstration of channel assignment in a wireless
metropolitan MESH network. In the 10th IEEE WoWMoM 2009, June
2009.
[37] R. Rawassizadeh and A M. Tjoa. Securing Shareable Life-logs. Social
Computing (SocialCom),, 2010.
[38] J. Hui, D. Culler, and S. Chakrabarti. 6LoWPAN: Incorporating IEEE
802.15.4 into the IP architecture. IPSO Alliance, 2009.
[39] C. E. Caicedo, J.B.D. Joshi, and S. R. Tuladhar. IPv6 Security Challenges.
Computer, 42(2), February 2009.
[40] R. Hummen, T. Heer, and K. Wehrle. A Security Protocol Adaptation
Layer for the IP-based Internet of Things. Interconnecting Smart Objects
with the Internet Workshop, 2011.
[41] P.A. Nixon, W. Wagealla, and C. English. Security, privacy and trust
issues in smart environments. Smart Environments, 2004.
[42] A. Cavoukian. Privacy by Design: The 7 Foundational Principles.
http://privacybydesign.ca/, 2011.
[43] M. Katagi and S. Moriai. Lightweight Cryptography for the Internet of
Things. Sony Corporation, 2008.
[44] T. Shirai, K. Shibutani, and T. Akishita. The 128-Bit Blockcipher CLE-
FIA. FSE, 2007.
[45] A Bogdanov, L Knudsen, G Leander, and C Paar. PRESENT: An ultra-
lightweight block cipher. Systems-CHES, 2007.
[46] The eSTREAM Project. http://www.ecrypt.eu.org/stream/, 2008.
[47] A. Regenscheid, J. Kelsey, and S. Paul. Status Report on the First Round
of the SHA-3 Cryptographic Hash Algorithm Competition. NIST, 2009.
[48] T. Eisenbarth, S. Kumar, C. Paar, A. Poschmann, and L. Uhsadel. A
Survey of Lightweight-Cryptography Implementations. IEEE Design &
Test of Computers, 24(6), November 2007.
[49] Digi XBee Pro. www.digi.com.
[50] Ettus Research. www.ettus.org.
[51] GNU Radio. http://gnuradio.org.
[52] T. Schmid. Gnu radio 802.15. 4 En-and decoding. UCLA NESL, Los
Angeles, CA, 2005.
[53] LAN/MAN Standards Committee. Part 15.4: Wireless Medium Access
Control (MAC) and Physical Layer (PHY) Specifications for Low-Rate
Wireless Personal Area Networks (LR-WPANs). IEEE Computer Society,
(October), 2003.
12
